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INTRODUCTION 
 In 2004, the South African Parliament enacted the Protection of 
Constitutional Democracy Against Terrorist and Related Activities Act 33 
of 2004 (“Terrorist Act”) and joined the international community in the 
fight against international terrorism.1 Prior to 2004, according to the then 
Minister of Safety and Security Steve Tshwete, South African law did not 
recognize international terrorism as a unique crime, despite the country’s 
promise and commitment to cooperate with other countries in the War on 
Terror.2 However, following the 1998 United States Embassy bombings in 
Kenya and Tanzania and the bombing of the twin towers in New York City 
in 2001, the status quo was about to change. For instance, in 2001 the Min-
ister eloquently described the problem with the status quo when he said, 
“we have offered our support to the Americans in the global fight against 
terrorism and the fact that we do not yet have an anti–terrorism law has put 
us under pressure.”3 The Minister also argued in favour of what is now the 
  
 * Associate Professor of Law, University of Witwatersrand, South Africa. This 
paper was presented at the MSU Journal of International Law Symposium titled, “Is There a 
War on Terror? Torture, Rendition, Guantanamo, and Obama’s Preventive Detention” at 
Michigan State University College of Law in February 2010. 
 1. Other countries like Canada, United States and Great Britain have passed similar 
within the last decade.  See, e.g., Anti–Terrorism Act, S.C. 2001, c. 41 (Dec. 18, 2001) 
(Can.); U.S.A. Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107–56, 115 Stat. 272 (U.S.) (Oct. 26, 2001); Anti–
Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, c. 24 (U.K.).   
 2. Ranjeni Munusamy, SA Puts Anti–Terror Law Back on the Agenda, SUNDAY 
TIMES, Sept. 23, 2001.  Previously, South Africa had terrorism laws passed by the apartheid 
government that were repealed in 1992.  See Terrorism Act 83 of 1967 (S. Afr.); Internal 
Security and Intimidation Amendment Act 138 of 1991 (S. Afr.); Internal Security Act 74 of 
1982 § 54 (S. Afr.), repealed by Safety Matters Rationalisation Act 90 of 1996 (S. Afr.).   
 3. Id. 
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Terrorist Act for South Africa when he observed that the “lack of [legisla-
tion] made South Africa a ‘safe haven’ for international terrorists and fugi-
tives.”4 The Minister was correct about this observation; in fact, one exam-
ple of the problems that emerged following the United States embassy 
bombing in Tanzania is the case of Mohamed v. President of the RSA,5 
which involved an international terrorist fugitive in South Africa.  
 In this highly publicised international case,6 Mr. Khalfan Khamis Mo-
hamed successfully challenged the decision of the South African govern-
ment to arrest and deport him from South Africa to the United States. He 
argued that his arrest, detention, and deportation was in breach of the provi-
sions of the Aliens Control Act 96 of 1991 (“Act”) and the regulations pub-
lished under it. In addition, he advanced a constitutional argument that his 
right to life; to human dignity; and not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman or 
degrading punishment under the South African Constitution (“Constitu-
tion”) had been infringed. In a unanimous decision, the South African Con-
stitutional Court (“Court”) held that the deportation of Mr. Mohamed to the 
United States without securing an assurance that he would not be subjected 
to the death penalty was a violation of his constitutional and statutory rights.  
 In this Article, I intend to do two things. The first is to demonstrate that 
Mohamed is the starting point of any discussion about South Africa’s in-
volvement in the global War on Terror because it illustrates the weak legal 
framework that existed prior to the adoption of the Terrorist Act. The sec-
ond is to demonstrate that in the subsequent years following Mohamed, 
South Africa adopted a broad piece of anti–terrorism legislation, which has 
made South Africa a good partner for the United States in the War on Ter-
ror. The Article argues that the judgment in Mohamed, which is progressive 
and should be welcomed, follows a line of cases recognising the importance 
of the right to life and human dignity under the Constitution.7 The article 
  
 4. Barbara Slaughter, South Africa: ANC government Pushes Through Draconian 
Anti–terrorism Legislation, WORLD SOCIALIST WEB SITE, Nov. 9, 2001, 
http://www.wsws.org/articles/2001/nov2001/sa-n09.shtml (last visited June 14, 2010). 
 5. 2001 (7) BCLR 685, 2001 (3) SA 893 (CC). 
 6. See Benjamin Weiser, U.S. to Seek Death Penalty for 2nd Defendant in Blasts, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2000, at B3, available at 
http://www.uniset.ca/other/news/nyt_deathpenalty2ddefendant.html (reporting that Attorney 
General authorized prosecutors to seek the death penalty against Mr. Mohamed); Estelle 
Ellis, Tanzanian Man’s Death Penalty Fight Fails, IOL, (Apr. 20, 2001, 14:23:02), available 
at http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?art_id=qw987769382274A621; Benjamin Weiser, U.S. 
Judge Sees Stonewalling On Tapes in Terrorism Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2005, at B3, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/18/nyregion/18tapes.html? r=1, (last visited 
Feb. 4, 2010); SA Court to Rule on Fate of Embassy Bomber Suspect, NEWS 24 (Mar. 26, 
2001), http://www.news24.com/xArchive/Archive/SA-court-to-rule-on-fate-of-embassy-
bomber-suspect-20010326 (last visited Feb. 4, 2010). 
 7. State v. Makwanyane, 1995 (36) SA 391BCLR 665 (CC) (S.Afr.) (recognizing 
that the right to life is the most important of all human rights together with the right to 
dignity); Soobramoney v. Minister of Health (KwaZulu Natal) 1997 (12) BCLR 1696, 1998 
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further argues that while the constitutionality of the Terrorist Act has not 
been tested by the courts, Mohamed provides a definitive statement of South 
African law about the lawful treatment of terror suspects and will likely 
influence future interpretation of the Terrorist Act.  
 The Article is divided into three main sections. Section I examines the 
Mohamed case. It discusses the background and issues of the case with a 
view to demonstrate the weak status of South African law and its ability to 
prosecute international terror suspects. Section II discusses the impact of 
Mohamed on the capital case against Mr. Mohamed in the Federal District 
Court for the Southern District of New York (“Federal Court”), and 
welcomes the outcome of the Federal Court decision. Section III discusses 
the impact and effect of Mohamed on the enactment of the Terrorist Act. 
This section briefly discusses specific provisions of the Terrorist Act that I 
believe were motivated by the challenges experienced in the case against 
Mr. Mohamed. I argue that under current legislation, which is considerably 
broad, South Africa is better prepared to play an important role in the War 
on Terror.  
I.  EXAMINING THE MOHAMED CASE 
A. The Background of the Case 
 Mohamed was an urgent appeal against a judgement in the Cape of Good 
Hope High Court (“High Court”).8 The High Court dismissed Mr. Mo-
hamed’s application to declare his arrest and deportation from South Africa 
to the United States as unlawful and unconstitutional. It also dismissed his 
application to direct the South African government to submit a written re-
quest, through diplomatic channels, to the United States government that the 
death penalty should not be sought in the event of a guilty verdict in charges 
against him in the matter of United States v. Osama Bin Laden.9 The facts 
which led to the appeal are the following: in 1998, Mr. Mohamed was in-
dicted by a federal grand jury in New York on a total of 267 counts arising 
  
(1) SA 765 (CC) at para. 55 (S.Afr.) (recognizing the sanctity of life). See also United States 
v. Bin Laden, 156 F.Supp.2d 359, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (noting that one of the defendants 
Mahmud Salim was extradited from Germany with an undertaking that  if convicted he 
would not face the death penalty); Soering v. United Kingdom, App. No. 14038/88, 11 Eur. 
H.R. Rep. 439 (1989). 
 8. Mohamed, 2001 (3) SA 893 (holding that the State had the right to deport Mr. 
Mohamed to the United States without first assuring that the death penalty would not be 
imposed).  Pursuant to the Renaming of High Courts Act 30, 2008, the Cape of Good Hope 
High Court was renamed as the Western Cape High Court with effect from 1 March 2009. 
 9. Bin Laden, 156 F.Supp.2d at 370.  See also United States v. Bin Laden, 92 
F.Supp.2d 225, 227 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); United States v. Bin Laden, 58 F.Supp.2d 113, 115 
(S.D.N.Y. 1999); United States v. Bin Laden, 132 F.Supp.2d 168 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); United 
States v. Bin Laden, 109 F.Supp.2d 211, 213 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
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out of the bombing of the United States Embassy in Tanzania.10 For this 
indictment, a warrant of arrest was issued by the Federal Court.11 On Octo-
ber 5, 1999 the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), to-
gether with South African authorities, arrested Mr. Mohamed at the immi-
gration office in Cape Town.12 According to South African authorities, Mr. 
Mohamed was advised of his right to counsel following his arrest.13 This 
was disputed by Mr. Mohamed during trial.14 He was then taken to a hold-
ing facility at the Cape Town International Airport, where he was detained 
and questioned by both South African and FBI authorities.15  
 Commenting on what transpired at the holding facility, the Court noted 
with disapproval that the affidavit submitted by Mr. Christo Terblanche, the 
Chief Immigration Officer from the Department of Home Affairs, did not 
indicate any warning as to the constitutional protection against self incrimi-
nation or the right to remain silent being given to Mr. Mohamed.16 Equally 
concerning to the Court, there was no mention of the right to legal represen-
tation, nor that any such rights were waived by Mr. Mohamed.17 The Court 
further noted with concern that the affidavit was also silent as to whether or 
not Mr. Mohamed had been given a choice as to whether he should be re-
moved from South Africa to Tanzania or the United States, and that he had 
expressed a clear and reasoned preference for the United States.18 Following 
the questioning, Mr. Mohamed was taken into custody by the FBI and flown 
to the United States where he appeared in the Federal Court to answer the 
charges mentioned above.19  
B.  The Issues Before the Court in Mohamed 
 According to the Court, there were two questions for determination. The 
first question was whether the deportation of Mr. Mohamed was lawful un-
der the Act. The Court noted that the State’s power to deport prohibited 
persons is derived from Sections 44 through 51 of the Act.20 It was further 
noted that none of these provisions empowers the State to determine the 
destination of a deported person.21 The only power granted to the State to 
  
 10. 156 F.Supp.2d at 370.   
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 35 (detailing the rights of arrested, detained, and 
accused persons). 
 17. Mohamed, 2001 (3) SA 893 at para. 18.  
 18. Id. at para. 18. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at para. 33. 
 21. Id. 
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determine the destination of a deported individual is contained in Regula-
tion 23 of the Act. The relevant section of Regulation 23 reads as follows: 
Any person to be removed from the Republic under the Act, shall –  
(a) if he or she is the holder of a passport issued by any other 
country or territory, be removed to that country or territory; or 
(b) if he or she is not the holder of such a passport –  
(i) be removed to the country or territory of which he or she is a 
citizen or national; or 
(ii) and if he or she is stateless, be removed to the country or 
territory where he or she has a right of domicile.22 
According to the Court’s interpretation of the above provision, the power to 
deport and determine the destination is limited to the places mentioned in 
paragraphs (a) and (b).23 According to this interpretation, the United States 
was not a destination permitted by Regulation 23, and thus South African 
authorities were not empowered to deport Mr. Mohamed to the United 
States, but presumably to Tanzania where he holds citizenship.24 
 The second question before the Court was whether the removal of Mr. 
Mohamed was permissible under the Constitution.25 Mr. Mohamed con-
tended that the Constitution in Section 7 obligates the South African gov-
ernment to promote the right to life; dignity; and not to be treated or pun-
ished in a cruel, inhuman, or degrading way. 26 He further argued that such 
obligation required that if he was to be removed to the United States, where 
he would likely face the death penalty, the government should secure an 
undertaking from the United States that the death penalty would not be im-
posed on him before permitting his removal. It is important to note that the 
basis for this argument was the Court’s landmark ruling in Makwanyane 
that capital punishment is inconsistent with the values and provisions of the 
Constitution.27  In addressing the above question, the Court reasoned that an 
obligation on the South African government to secure an assurance that the 
death penalty will not be imposed on a person whom it causes to be re-
moved from South Africa to another country cannot depend (as suggested 
by the government) on whether the removal is by extradition or deporta-
  
 22. Id. at para. 34.   
 23. Mohamed, 2001 (3) SA 893 at para. 35. 
 24. Id. at para. 68. 
 25. Id. at para. 4. 
 26. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 7(2) (providing that “[t]he State must respect, 
protect, promote and fulfill the rights in the Bill of Rights .”).  
 27. 1995 (3) SA 391. 
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tion.28 Instead, the Court reasoned that the obligation depends on the provi-
sions of the Constitution and not the Act.29   
The Court’s conclusion on this question should be welcomed because it 
is consistent with the constitutional obligation of the courts. In Sections 
39(1)(a) and (b), the Constitution provides “that when interpreting the Bill 
of Rights, a court must promote the values that underlie an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom and must 
consider international law.”30 Some of the values that underlie an open and 
democratic society are the rights to life and human dignity, which, as the 
Court ruled in Makwanyane and Soobramoney v. Min of Health, KwaZulu–
Natal,31 are some of the most important rights in the Bill of Rights.32 
Additionally, South Africa is a party to the Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“Convention 
Against Torture”), which it ratified in December 1998.33 Article 3(1) of the 
Convention Against Torture states that “no State Party shall expel, return 
(“refouler”) or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial 
grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to 
torture.”34 Therefore, it would have been inconsistent with Section 39(1)(a) 
and international law if the Court had ruled otherwise on whether or not the 
South African government had an obligation to secure an undertaking that 
the death penalty would not be imposed on Mr. Mohamed.  
Furthermore, the Court’s decision should be welcomed because it follows 
a line of other progressive decisions from Canada and Europe that have 
abolished the death penalty. For example, one of the landmark cases relied 
on by the Court in support of its decision was Minister of Justice v. Burns.35 
In this case, the Supreme Court of Canada unanimously held that there is an 
obligation on the Canadian government, before extraditing a suspect, to 
seek an assurance from the receiving State that the death penalty will not be 
imposed. According to the Supreme Court, such obligation arises out of 
  
 28. See JOHN DUGARD, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A SOUTH AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE 
130–41 (Kenwyn ed., Juta & Co. 1994), for a discussion on the difference between 
extradition and deportation.  Max Du Plessis, Removals, Terrorism and Human Rights–
Reflections on Rashid, 25 SAJHR 353, 360–62 (2009); McMullen v. I.N.S., 788 F.2d 591, 
596 (9th Cir. 1986); Halm v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration), [1996] 1 
F.C. 547104 F.T.R. 81 (Can. Ont. T.D.).  
 29. 2001 (3) SA 893 at para. 43. 
 30. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 39(1)(a) – (b). 
 31. 1998 (1) SA 765.   
 32. See also Kaunda v. President of the RSA, 2005 (4) SA 235 (CC) (S. Afr.) 
(discussing the important of the right to life and human dignity in the South African 
Constitution). 
 33. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. No. 100–20, 1465 
U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force June 26, 1987).  
 34. Id. art. 3. 
 35. 2001 SCC 17, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283, para. 143 (Can.). 
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Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which provides 
that “everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person and the 
right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the provision of 
fundamental justice.”36 However, unlike under Canadian law, where the 
deprivation of the right to life and human dignity is qualified by other fun-
damental principles, the Court emphasized that South African constitutional 
law sets different standards for protecting the right to life; human dignity; 
and the right not to be treated in a cruel, inhuman, or degrading way; and 
noted that there are no exceptions to the protections of these rights under 
South African constitutional law. The Court added that while the rights in 
the Constitution are subject to limitation in terms of Section 36, the Mak-
wanyane Court unanimously held that capital punishment was not justifiable 
under the Constitution.  
Furthermore, the Court relied on a number of European cases decided by 
the European Court of Human Rights, including Soering v. United King-
dom,37 for the proposition that it is contrary to Article 3 of the European 
Convention on Human and Fundamental Rights (“European Convention”), 
which protects against torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or pun-
ishment, for a State party to surrender a fugitive to another State where 
there were substantial grounds for believing that such fugitive would be 
subjected to torture or inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment.38 
As a result, the Court was satisfied that European cases are consistent with 
the weight that the “Constitution gives to the spirit, purport, and objects of 
the Bill of Rights.”39 In addition, the Court observed that European cases 
draw no distinction between deportation and extradition in the application 
of Article 3 of the European Convention. It also found that such distinction 
did not exist under the Convention Against Torture.  In the final analysis, 
the Court held that it was contrary to the underlying values of the Constitu-
tion and inconsistent with the obligation to protect the right to life of every-
one for the South African government to cooperate with the United States 
government to secure the removal of Mr. Mohamed from South Africa to 
the United States.  
In light of the above discussion, it should be clear that Mohamed is the 
starting point of the discussion about international terrorism in post–
apartheid South Africa because it was the first international terrorism case 
that exposed the inadequacy under South African law to prosecute interna-
tional terrorism cases at the time. Additionally, Mohamed is important be-
  
 36.  Mohamed, at 702 paras. 46-48, citing Minister of Justice v. Burns, 2001 SCC 17. 
 37. 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 439. 
 38. See Hilal v. United Kingdom, App. No. 45276/99, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 31 (2001) 
(holding that it was a breach of article 3 of the European Convention to deport a Tanzanian 
citizen to Tanzania where he would face a serious risk of being subjected to torture or 
degrading treatment); Chahal v. United Kingdom, App. No. 70/1995/576/662, 23 Eur. H.R. 
Rep. 413 (1996). 
 39. 2001 (3) SA 893 at para. 59.   
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cause of the Court’s pronouncements regarding the permissible treatment of 
terror suspects. For example, the Court suggested that the right to the consti-
tutional guarantees against self–incrimination and to remain silent must be 
afforded to terror suspects.40 Another important constitutional guarantee 
was the right to counsel, which the Court suggested has to be afforded to 
terror suspects.41 These pronouncements will likely be used as a point of 
reference by South African courts for decades to come in the interpretation 
of the Terrorist Act and the treatment of terror suspects in South Africa. The 
Mohamed case is also significant because it had an impact on the outcome 
of the capital case against Mr. Mohamed in the Federal Court. 
II.   THE IMPACT OF THE COURT DECISION ON THE CAPITAL CASE AGAINST 
MR. MOHAMED 
 Following his trial in the Federal Court case of United States v. Osama 
bin Laden, arising out of his participation in the American Embassy bomb-
ing in Tanzania, a federal jury in New York found Mr. Mohamed guilty.42 
Before the Federal Court began a penalty phase hearing, Mr. Mohamed filed 
a motion and sought the following relief: (1) that the Federal Court should 
preclude the United States government from further seeking the death pen-
alty against him; or, if the United States government is permitted to proceed 
with its capital case, (2) that Mr. Mohamed should be permitted to introduce 
as a mitigating factor the decision of the Court in Mohamed.43 
 In addressing the first question, Judge Sand of the Federal Court exam-
ined the history of Mr. Mohamed’s case in the South African courts and 
ruled that the decision of the Court, while clarifying South African law with 
regard to extradition or deportation of persons to countries which have the 
death penalty, does not disturb the Federal Court’s earlier ruling in United 
States v. Bin Laden44 permitting the United States government to seek the 
death penalty. Therefore, the Federal Court declined to reconsider that deci-
sion. The Federal Court’s holding on the first question was based on a two–
fold rationale. The first was that, while the Federal Court accepted the 
Court’s decision in Mohamed as the definitive statement of South African 
law, it had an obligation to enforce United States law.45 The second was that 
Mohamed clarified an area of law that was previously unsettled.46 More-
over, the extradition treaty in force at the time of Mr. Mohamed’s arrest and 
deportation did not allow the South African government to condition his 
  
 40. Id. at para. 18. 
 41. Id. at para. 67. 
 42. 126 F.Supp. 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 43. Id. at 293. 
 44. See 126 F.Supp. 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 45. 156 F.Supp.2d 365. 
 46. Id. 
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extradition on a guarantee that the death penalty would not be sought.47 
Therefore, in light of the uncertainty in South African law it was reasonable 
for FBI agents, whom the Federal Court was satisfied acted in good faith, to 
rely on South African authorities’ interpretation of South African law.48 
Furthermore, the Federal Court’s examination of the existing extradition 
treaty between South Africa and the United States at the time of Mr. Mo-
hamed’s arrest revealed that no provision expressly prohibited the proce-
dures that were followed to remove Mr. Mohamed to the United States, and 
hence the Federal Court concluded that Mr. Mohamed was not entitled to 
the first relief. 
In light of this conclusion, the Federal Court then addressed Mr. Mo-
hamed’s alternative argument, which as indicated above, was a plea for 
permission to introduce the judgment in Mohamed as a mitigating factor 
during his penalty phase hearing. In other words, Mr. Mohamed’s argument 
was that since his exposure to the death penalty was the product of happen-
stance, he should be permitted to introduce the judgment in Mohamed as a 
mitigating factor. In addressing this question, the Federal Court began by 
explaining that the right of Mr. Mohamed as a capital defendant to present 
mitigating factors to the jury during the penalty phase hearing was firmly 
established in Lockett v. Ohio.49 It explained that the statute under which the 
United States government sought the death penalty against Mr. Mohamed 
enumerates eight specific categories of statutory mitigating factors.50 The 
fourth statutory mitigating factor was the most relevant in this case; it rec-
ognised the fact that “other equally culpable defendants will not be punished 
by death” was a mitigating factor to be considered by the jury.51 
In addition, the Federal Court reasoned that Congress’s deliberate inclu-
sion of the fourth mitigating factor into the legislative scheme requires a 
broad interpretation of the range of permissible statutory mitigating fac-
tors.52 Accordingly, the position of other defendants like Mamdouh Mah-
mud Salim, Khalid al Fawwaz, Ibrahim Eidarous and Adel Abdel Bary, who 
were equally culpable but not subjected to the death penalty, was a com-
  
 47. See Treaty of Extradition, U.S.-S.Afr., Dec. 18, 1947, 2 U.S.T. 884. 
 48. United States v. Yousef, 925 F.Supp 1063, 1076 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that 
the United States law enforcement agents cannot be held liable for the way in which foreign 
government agents act in extradition proceedings of people in their custody); United States v. 
Lira, 515 F.Supp.2d 68, 71 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding that United States agents were entitled to 
rely on a foreign government’s interpretation of its own laws).  
 49.  438 U.S. 586, 608 (1978). 
 50. Id. 
 51. 18 U.S.C. § 3592(a)(8) (2006). 
 52. 438 U.S. at 608. 
 
114 Michigan State Journal of International Law [Vol. 19:1 
 
parative factor which is appropriate for jurors to consider when evaluating 
whether a death sentence is appropriate.53  
In particular and on the facts of this case, the Federal Court suggested 
that Mr. Mohamed should be able to point out that under the terms of his 
extradition from Germany, defendant Mamdouh Mahmud Salim was not 
subject to the death penalty.54 Similarly, the three defendants, whose extra-
dition from the United Kingdom was pending at the time of trial, would also 
not be eligible for the death penalty, presumably because of the series of 
cases by the European Court of Human Rights that have ruled against extra-
dition of suspects to countries that have the death penalty without a guaran-
tee that the death penalty would not be imposed.55 According to the Federal 
Court, it would be relevant and consistent with the legislative scheme to 
permit Mr. Mohamed to argue to the jury that if things had gone as the Mo-
hamed Court says they should have, he too would not be eligible for the 
death penalty.56 In the end, the Federal Court ruled in favour of Mr. Mo-
hamed by granting his request to present the decision of the Court in Mo-
hamed as a mitigating factor. At the end of the penalty phase hearing, the 
jury failed to reach a unanimous verdict, and as a result the judge sentenced 
Mr. Mohamed to life imprisonment without parole.57 
It is difficult to criticize the Federal Court’s decision refusing to enforce 
and apply the Court’s decision in Mohamed on the basis that its primary 
function is to apply and enforce American law, not South African law. It is 
unthinkable that this function extends to the enforcement of foreign law. In 
fact, I would imagine that the outcome reached by the Federal Court would 
be unchanged if Mohamed had been decided by the United States Supreme 
Court and Mr. Mohamed tried to enforce it in South African courts.  
III.  THE IMPACT AND EFFECTS OF MOHAMED ON THE ENACTMENT OF THE 
TERRORIST ACT 
The decision in Mohamed has had several notable effects and 
implications on the status of South African law. One of the important effects 
is that it clarified South African law on these matters. This was also 
acknowledged by the Federal Court when it expressed a strong view that 
Mohamed clarified an area of South African law that was unsettled at the 
time of Mr. Mohamed’s arrest and prior to the Court’s decision.58 In 
particular, Mohamed clarified that the Constitution restricts the South 
  
 53. United States v. Beckford, 962 F.Supp. 804, 814 (E.D. Va. 1997) (explaining that 
proportionality, equity and fairness are the goals which underlie the mitigating factor 
regarding equally culpable defendants). 
 54. Id. 
 55. See Hilal, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 31 (2001); Soering, 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 439. 
 56. 438 U.S. at 608. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Bin Laden, 156 F.Supp.2d at 365. 
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African government in relation to its implementation of political or foreign 
policy decisions in support of the War on Terror.59 Other commentators 
have observed that Mohamed stands for the proposition that political 
imperatives and foreign policy concerns must take a back seat when 
weighed against important constitutional rights.60 I submit that these effects 
of Mohamed should be welcomed because they are in line with a generous 
and progressive approach to provide protection for civil liberties in times of 
heightened national security.  
Another important implication of Mohamed is that it exposed the 
absence of a legal framework to try international terrorism cases, such as the 
one involving Mr. Mohamed, in South Africa. This revelation intensified 
the pressures from within and outside of South Africa to enact the Terrorist 
Act.61 While these pressures were triggered by domestic terrorist acts in 
Western Cape province in the late 1990s and the circumstances of the 
Mohamed case, it became clear that following the New York bombings and 
the subsequent United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 that was 
adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations in 
September 2001,62 the Terrorist Act had to be adopted in South Africa. In 
his work on the comparison between South African and Canadian anti–
terrorism legislation, Kent Roach has noted some of the reasons that led to 
South Africa’s delay in the adoption of the Terrorist Act.63 He suggests that 
one of the reasons was the South African government’s reaction to the 
understandable sensitivities about the unpopular abuse of anti–terrorism 
laws during the apartheid era.64 He observes that this is apparent when one 
reads the preamble to the Terrorist Act.65 Another reason is that the first 
draft bill that was released in 2000 by the South African Human Rights 
Commission66 was controversial and generated extensive debate and 
  
 59. See also Kaunda, 2005 (4) SA 235 (holding that the South African foreign policy 
must be consistent with the Constitution). 
 60. See Stephen Pete & Max du Plessis, South African Nationals Abroad and Their 
Right to Diplomatic Protection – Lessons from the “Mercenaries Case,” 22 SAJHR 439, 468 
(2006); STUART WOOLMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF SOUTH AFRICA 31–116 (Michael 
Chaskalson ed., 2d ed. 2005); Du Plessis, supra note 13, at 359. 
 61. But see Martin Schonteich, South Africa’s Arsenal of Terrorism Legislation, 9 
AFR. SEC. REV. 2 (2000) (arguing that an anti–terrorism law is not needed because South 
Africa already has sufficient security laws that could be used to deal with terrorism crimes. 
The problem is that many of the available laws are not being used fully by the security forces 
because of a variety of operational weaknesses in the criminal justice system and the state’s 
intelligence agencies). 
 62. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES 1373 (September 28, 2001). 
 63. Kent Roach, A Comparison of South African and Canadian Anti-terrorism 
Legislation, 18 S. AFR. J. CRIM. JUST. 127, 130 (2005).  
 64. Id.   
 65. Id.  
 66. Roach, supra note 63 at 130.   
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opposition in civil society.67 Following the 2000 draft bill, another draft bill 
was issued by the South African Law Commission in August 2002. 
Parliament debated and amended it, and while the 2002 bill was passed in 
the National Assembly, one of the two houses of Parliament, the National 
Council of Provinces, rejected the bill.68 The bill was later passed by a new 
Parliament following the 2004 elections.69  
In my view, Mohamed had a considerable effect on the bill that was 
eventually passed into law in 2004. For example, the broad definition of 
terrorist activity under Section 1 of the Terrorist Act applies to acts 
committed in and outside South Africa. In Section 15, the Terrorist Act 
requires some nexus between the terrorist activity and South Africa and 
provides a process for notification to other States that may have jurisdiction. 
These provisions were influenced by the problems that emerged in the case 
of Mohamed. For instance, one of the problems in Mohamed was that the 
crimes were committed in a foreign country or jurisdiction against a third 
State party. It was difficult for South Africa to prosecute, not only because it 
did not have sufficient legislation, but also because the United States had an 
interest in prosecuting the perpetrators. The Terrorist Act addresses these 
problems by ensuring that its provisions apply to acts committed in or 
outside South Africa, and by providing a process in Section 15 where South 
Africa will cooperate with other countries or international organizations 
interested in a terror suspect. Legal commentators have pointed out that the 
South African approach seems preferable given the practical limits on the 
ability of the State to prosecute terrorism offenses committed elsewhere.70  
Another provision in the Terrorist Act which was influenced by 
Mohamed is Section 22. This provision confers the state with broad 
investigative powers with respect to persons who possess relevant 
information about the commission of terrorist acts. What is controversial 
about Section 22 is that no prior judicial authorisation is required for the 
exercise of such investigative powers. In other words, under the current 
legislation, an investigative hearing, such as the one conducted by the South 
African authorities and the FBI at the Cape Town International Airport on 
Mr. Mohamed, would probably not require judicial approval. In this sense, I 
agree with the observations of Roach that given that the Terrorist Act has 
not been tested by the courts, it remains to be seen whether the courts would 
defend the principle of prior judicial approval in the context of Section 22 of 
the Terrorist Act and strike it down on constitutional grounds. In this regard, 
Professor Max du Plessis has called on “South African courts to be 
  
 67. See S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 184. Protection of Constitutional Democracy 
Against Terrorist and Related Activities Act 22, 2004 (providing in part that “whereas the 
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reminded of their constitutional role to act as guardians against executive 
overreaching, particularly in the context of the [W]ar on [T]error.”71 There 
is no doubt that these broad investigative powers are constitutionally 
problematic and may not survive constitutional muster under the authority 
of Mohamed. 
On the other hand, given South Africa’s heavy reliance on Canadian case 
law and the influence of Canada’s Anti Terrorism Act of 2001 on the 
Terrorist Act, it could be argued that the decision by the Canadian Supreme 
Court to uphold the investigative powers under Canada’s Anti Terrorism 
Act could be employed by South African courts as a basis to uphold similar 
powers under the Terrorist Act.72 This potential outcome is enhanced by the 
striking mutual interaction between the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms and the Constitution, which is well established, and the 
connection between the Terrorist Act and Canada’s Anti Terrorism Act.73  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Based on the forgoing discussion and the theme of this symposium, 
which asks, “[I]s There a War on Terror?”, I argue that if there is a War on 
Terror, then South Africa is a good partner to countries like the United 
States because it is ready to liaise and cooperate while it protects the right to 
life and human dignity. 
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